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You are called to the medical ward to see a patient who has
worsening respiratory status and may require mechanical
ventilation. When you arrive you are informed that, based on
many factors, including age, pre-existing quality of life, and
negligible chances of ‘meaningful’ recovery, many members
of the medical team feel that admission to the intensive care
unit (ICU) would not be appropriate for this patient.
Unfortunately, there are no advanced directives from the
patient, and the patient is unable to participate in decision
making. On full review you also believe that the patient would
not survive ICU admission, and although mechanical
ventilation may prolong life it would not correct the underlying
illness. You discuss everything with the patient’s family and
they request ICU admission. You are uncertain about the
ethics of providing life support such as mechanical ventilation
when you feel that there is no chance of recovery.
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Abstract
Most hospitals are facing the dilemma caused by demand for critical care beds outstripping supply.
This imbalance is likely to get worse over the coming years as a result of many factors, including aging
of the population, improved technology, and improved therapies, among other factors. As a result we
are likely to have to make further tough decisions about rationing of this service. In this issue of Critical
Care, two authors debate the appropriateness of providing life support in accordance with a family’s
wishes to an individual who is unlikely to survive admission to the intensive care unit. Understanding
both sides of this debate is an important aspect of an intensivist’s job.
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The scenario
Pro: Yes, under the current rules, life support must be given regardless of prognosis
David Crippen
The key statement in the scenario under consideration is that
‘… although mechanical ventilation may prolong life it would not
correct the underlying illness’. There is no question that critical
care can maintain ‘life’ almost indefinitely, and this fact is well
known to the public [1]. Health care consumers are granted
broad powers of choice in health care options. If they choose to
equate stable vital signs with sapient life, then physicians are
not empowered to question the whys and wherefores thereof
[2]. The chances of recovery are matters of opinion that are
steeped in emotion and media manipulation. The entire world
loves the unexpected survivor, especially after long lines of
experts previously have forecasted inevitable demise.232
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Accordingly, the urban legend of the ‘long shot survivor’
figures into our definitions of futility. The current working
definition of medical futility is a treatment plan that does not
achieve its desired objective [3]. Physicians are not required
to drill holes in crania to relieve headaches, even if
demanded, because it does not work. However, the addition
of ‘life support’ to divert a death spiral is technically effective
in maintaining ‘life’, as defined by stable vital signs. As far as
they go, these treatments ‘effectively’ support open-ended
hope goals even in the face of convincing evidence to the
contrary. As long as ‘life’ is supported, anything is possible. If
the patient is dead, nothing is possible.
So, we take the potential for unexpected recovery into
account in our definitions of ‘futility’. Surrogates feel that
these systems can prolong vital signs during the search for a
miracle long shot cure [4]. We are obliged to provide them
because they are not ‘futile’ by the strict definition, and if a
treatment is not futile by the strict definition then it is
ethically and even legally mandated if patient or surrogate
desires it [5]. The only way to change this mandate is to
change the definition of futility. Instead of an inability to
maintain vital signs, futility must be expanded to include
irreversible multiple organ system failure. Until that occurs, it
does not matter how providers define futility. The law will
mandate providers to accede to the desires of surrogates,
and if surrogates continue to equate maintenance of vital
signs with ‘life’ then we must continue to support those vital
signs as long as our high technology care plan is effective in
doing so.
Like it or not, quality of ‘life’ does not enter into it. Like it or
not, under the current law we must maintain this patient in
the ICU for as long as the family desires it.
Con: No, life support: it really isn't THAT special!
Laura Hawryluck
Life support is aptly named. Fundamentally, such
technologies are tools – albeit potent ones – that provide
support only. The concept of life support is somewhat
overblown because it never cures; it merely permits
modulation of disease course so that other interventions (e.g.
antibiotics) have time to affect an actual cure. It is clear that,
at a certain point, for survival the body must have the
capacity to heal. In this respect, although it may be
associated with a higher level of acuity, intenseness,
emotions, and even drama, life support at its core is no
different from other medical interventions and is clearly not
worthy of ‘special status’.
Such cold truths are seldom acknowledged and rarely
understood by patients and families. The myth that intensive
care medicine has incredible powers and has ‘special status’
permeates the language used to discuss these interventions.
It is commonplace to pose questions such as ‘Do you want
us to do everything?’ and ‘Would you want to go on life
support?’ without any further explanation of what exactly is
involved, what can and cannot be achieved, what the
burdens may be, what the likelihood of achieving the goals is,
what the impact on quality of life may be, and what the
alternative treatment options are. Failure to provide such
basic information has led to important decisions regarding
life support being the least informed decisions in health care,
and precludes any notion of informed consent. Moreover,
rates of success [6–8] are grossly inflated whereas the
discomforts are rarely portrayed.
Autonomy has led to the effacement of health care providers
in decision making, and to a prevailing sense that patients and
families have the only say and can receive almost any
intervention that they insist upon. However, health care
providers still have an ethical and legal obligation to help
patients and families place all decisions in context and to
recommend a treatment plan [9,10]. Glorifying life support as
a ‘special’ intervention would appear to render any
discussions less than honest and may help health care
providers to evade communication regarding death and dying.
Larger dilemmas remain. In today’s world of globalization we
seek to express respect for different cultural and religious
beliefs. Some believe that all possible efforts should be made
to preserve life, and hence we see life support continued
when it is clear that survival is impossible and serious
questions about quality of life arise. How do we manifest
respect for such beliefs? How is this different from saying my
personal beliefs are that I want everything done to save me at
any cost? Are such beliefs less worthy of respect because I
do not belong to an identified religious or cultural group? Am
I compelled to join such groups to be heard and respected?
How vague an expression of my beliefs and values is too
vague? Furthermore, faced with increasingly scarce and
expensive resources, how do we balance the rights of such
individuals against those of the larger collective? Certainly
the idea of life support having ‘special’ status makes any
resolution more difficult for all involved, both emotionally and
psychologically.
It is only by accepting and explaining that life-sustaining
interventions are not ‘special’ that we can begin to discuss in
an intelligent manner these important questions among
ourselves as health care professionals and with society in
general. The answers to these questions will help guide us
into the next century.233
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Pro response: Until we change the rules, we must abide by them
David Crippen
Patients and surrogates are allowed to demand life support
without giving any justification as long as that care is effective
in sustaining vital signs. Quality of life is not clearly defined
ethically or legally. Most surrogates listen to reason but they
do not have to. If they choose to invoke it, the current case
law is on their side, rendering end of life support issues very
special indeed. Dr Hawryluck dwells on what they ‘should’
do. What they ‘can’ do is be in charge of clinical ICU care.
This fact has significant practical implications for the delivery
of critical care.
Con response: Weighing in on quality – the role, the obligation, the voice?
Laura Hawryluck
If substitute decision makers get anything they want, without
regard for quality of life, then we deny the value of years of
training and the carefully acquired skills to make treatment
recommendations, and relegate physicians to ‘option
presenters’. People should be asked to look no further than the
internet and be expected to make decisions on the information
they obtain, even if bizarre or downright mistaken. If we do not
strongly advocate consideration of quality of life in life support
decisions, then how can we say that we even begin to fulfil our
obligations as professionals to ‘First do no harm’?
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